GLOBALISATION has made countries more interconnected with each other and just as equally dependent.

However, contrary to assumptions, these links have not reduced the risks of conflict. As nations chart pandemic-related recovery plans, there has been a marked shift in values and priorities that undermine the foundations of international cooperation.

In its place is the greater preference for unilateral action and a disregard for the norms and arrangements of existing regional and international organisations, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organisation, World Health Organisation and Asean.

This is pertinent to a deeply interdependent region, such as Southeast Asia, which envisioned its regional institution and mechanisms to be a facilitator to strengthen such ties. However, as Asean and other similar organisations bear the brunt of these changes, they face a crisis of relevance.

Considering the perceived diminishing purpose, it has to not only reinvigorate its purpose and function but also rebuild the confidence in its members that it is able to mitigate the negative effects brought by disruptions.

The current international climate highlights the mounting difficulties of maintaining cordial relations while dealing with the risk of being perceived as choosing sides. Southeast Asia has long felt the strain of great power rivalries and the broader effects on their respective strategic and economic considerations.

More notably, it is now experiencing the acute effects from the United States-China rivalry. The region has mostly retained its neutrality under the goal of international and regional stability and remains averse to the American geopolitical ambition of separating the bloc from China while displaying suspicion towards Beijing’s assertive behaviour.

Some of the regional challenges include the recent visit of US Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan,which sparked cross-strait tensions there, and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. The Sino-American competition shows the risks the region faces, not just for its engagement with the world but also for its own development.

The risks of being drawn further into such competitive dynamics have pushed Asean into renewing interest to diversify engagement. Not only would this allow new collaborative opportunities but also reduce dependencies on certain countries and mitigate potential negative effect.

Neighbours, which are also Asean dialogue partners, such as South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, are some of the examples. They have become a “preferred” option, not just for their perceived lower risk but also the mutual benefits aligned to their national interests.

South Korea has been actively pursuing engagement with the region following former president Moon Jae-in’s New Southern Policy (NSP). The Koreans share concerns of reducing reliance on China and seek additional means to mitigate the security risks in the Korean Peninsula.

Other goals include securing regional supply chains, improving infrastructure, enhancing the digital economy, achieving carbon neutrality and innovation. However, it remains uncertain if President Yoon Suk-yeol’s new approach can sustain the positive momentum to strengthen its position as a trusted partner in the region.

In the case of Australia and New Zealand, they are pursuing deeper relations with the region as part of efforts to rebuild cooperative relationships. There is an element of trying to reduce economic dependency on China but the broader goal is to pursue global agendas that have been neglected since the pandemic.

Their efforts are most noticeable in their recovery measures, such as the steps taken to upgrade the Asean, Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA). It is the central pillar of their trade and investment relationship with Asean since coming into force in 2010 with the aim of modernising trade agreements, reducing trade barriers and boosting trade and investment.

Despite the range of collaborative partners, the pact is dependent on Asean and its member states. Recent high-level Asean events, such as the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the upcoming summit in November, raise the recurring question of the extent of its capacity and willingness to pursue its aspirations.

While Aseancan bring world powers to forums, such as the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), it seems unable to command the authority when it comes to ongoing international and regional matters.

This was evident through the increasing number of mini-lateral engagements that have included the Southeast Asian region in their strategic considerations. Arrangements, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Australia, India, Japan and the United States; the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security pact; and similar Indo-Pacific-centric initiatives led by the US, have demonstrated their choice to operate outside of existing platforms but also compete with them with their preferred status quo. 

Part of the inability to assert its centrality is reflective of a lack of internal cohesion and informality at the institutional level. Much of these have already been noted and criticised since the early days of Asean, where they are seen as obstacles to managing regional security and economic challenges. There is a lack of legally binding agreements and mechanisms that ensure compliance, especially when it comes to matters of dispute settlement.

Another key challenge is that its principles of neutrality, non-interference in domestic affairs and consensus-based decision-making have become barriers to resolving key issues.

Recent examples include the deteriorating situation in Myanmar, where the commitment to non-interference had neutered the strongly worded statements forwarded. Even protracted issues, such as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, remain stagnant over the lack of consensus among the member states because of their varying positions towards China.

While these regional platforms can become an important facilitator to defuse inter-state tensions and boost connectivity, they remain largely dependent on external factors. The interest from Asean’s dialogue partners to engage with the region shows that the opportunities exist to benefit their respective economic and strategic interests.

However, Asean’s inability to forge a united, cohesive front among member states has limited its ability to produce tangible outcomes. Much of the criticism goes to its self-prescribed role as a “manager” of the region, while lacking the material and normative powers to facilitate such change.

If Asean wants to achieve the goals it often declares, it needs to make the hard decisions to re-evaluate its institutional capacity.

Izzah Ibrahim is an analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.