This article first appeared in Forum, The Edge Malaysia Weekly on April 24, 2017 - April 30, 2017

Tension is ratcheting up again on the Korean Peninsula. In the wake of the US military strike on Syria, the deployment of US strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Vinson to the East China Sea, and President Donald Trump’s statements in the lead-up to the recent Trump-Xi Jinping meeting in the US, there is growing apprehension that the US may take military action against North Korea.

Concerned with the rising tension, Beijing and Moscow have urged cooler heads to prevail. What purpose a military strike would serve seems unclear. It could be designed to deter further developments or set back North Korea’s nuclear weapon capability, or it could be a tit for tat reaction to prevent North Korea from developing an effective intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

It is uncertain if preemptive military action will succeed in achieving any of these purposes. The ­option of preemptive military action may have been more viable a decade or two ago, but the chances of success have reduced greatly over the years. There is also the possibility that a preemptive military strike could further escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula and increase Pyongyang’s resolve to become a nuclear weapon state with the capability to strike the US. The failed missile test by North Korea may provide breathing space for all parties to reconsider their positions.

The argument of this column is that the central problem vis-à-vis North Korea is not nuclear weapons. Making them the central issue conflates symptom and cause. The conflict on the Korean Peninsula existed well before the development of nuclear weapon capability by North Korea. Although the Korean conflict may have its origins in the Cold War, the dynamics of the conflict have become local. Both Koreas do not accept the division of the Korean nation. They seek to unify the Korean nation under one state but fundamentally differ on how and when unification should occur, and over the eventual nature of the political and economic systems and international orientation of a unified Korea.

Although both Koreas are members of the United Nations and have existed as separate states for over 60 years, they do not accept the legitimacy of each other and engage in hostile behaviour. Further, since the 1970s, North Korea has become an insecure regime and state.

With rapid economic development and strong US military support, South Korea became much stronger than North Korea. With the dissolution of its alliance with the former Soviet Union and a cutback in Chinese support, North Korea became the weaker party in the North-South relationship, reversing the advantages Pyongyang enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s.

The North Korean regime and state became highly insecure, and began to view nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of regime and state security. This was a strong incentive for North Korea to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon capability to deter the US, South Korea and Japan from acting aggressively against it.

To believe that China can influence North Korea on this vital national security issue, as seems to be the belief in American policy circles, is baseless. One is reminded of a statement by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s that Pakistanis would eat grass to develop a nuclear weapon capability.

The two Koreas, especially North Korea, also view Japan and, to a lesser degree, China, with deep suspicion. It is important to begin addressing the political disputes that lie at the heart of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. If these conflicts are resolved amicably, then the significance of nuclear weapons will reduce greatly, though it will not be eliminated. Once acquired, very rarely will a state, especially one in the context of the Korean situation, give up its nuclear weapon capability.

US policy toward the Korean Peninsula over the last several decades has been counterproductive. Continuing to support South Korea and calling for the rollback of North Korea’s nuclear weapon capability has only intensified its security dilemma and increased Pyongyang’s resolve to become a nuclear weapon state.

If it is to avoid military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Washington must fundamentally alter its policy. It will have to come to terms with a nuclear weapon-capable North Korea. Instead of further isolating the North and imposing additional sanctions, Washington must accept it as a member of the ­International community with legitimate security concerns and begin to address those.

It must encourage negotiations between North and South Korea as well as the two Koreas and ­Japan, and with China as well, and conclude a peace treaty to replace the prevailing armistice. Dialogue to address the political problems would become more possible if the liberal party candidate wins the forthcoming presidential election in South Korea.

The recommendation of this column may seem a complete reversal of US policy over the last several decades. Nevertheless, a complete reversal is necessary to bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula. It is pertinent to note here that the Clinton administration came close to establishing normal diplomatic relations with North Korea. Madeline Albright visited Pyongyang in 2002 to lay the groundwork for a visit by President Bill Clinton, which did not materialise.

Later, despite labelling North Korea a member of the Axis of Evil, the George W Bush administration recognised the insecurity of the North Korean regime and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was willing to give an assurance that the US would not undertake military action against that country. The adoption of a new policy becomes necessary if the old policy has consistently failed and its continuation will only further aggravate the situation.

At the same time as it is tackling the underlying political problems, it is important to assure Japan and South Korea of the extended deterrence protection of the US.  Action must be taken to address the extended deterrence concerns of these two allies. Deterrence, reconciliation and efforts to resolve the underlying political disputes must proceed simultaneously.

Datuk Muthiah Alagappa is Visiting Professor in the Asia-Europe Institute at Universiti Malaya. He is a Distinguished Research Scholar at the School of International Service at the American University and Non-Resident Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, both in Washington, DC.

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