This article first appeared in The Edge Malaysia Weekly on April 16, 2018 - April 22, 2018
I recently wrote in this newspaper a by-now-perhaps-vainglorious inaugural piece, in which I surmised that the later the next general election (GE) is held — perhaps towards the very end of the legally permitted parliamentary term limit — the likelier the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition will score better results.
This is mainly because the constituencies that would determine the results of the next GE are primarily those either located in the rural areas or comprised of chiefly urban lower middle-class voters. For these voters, the need to improve their livelihoods and income opportunities are of supreme importance even when it comes to political choices. BN, with its incumbent advantage, is in a privileged position to command the various forms of national or other resources that are required to deliver infrastructural developments, job opportunities as well as many other forms of subsidies and incentives that would no doubt induce these thankful voters to cast their votes in favour of the ruling coalition.
Thus, the longer BN could “splash” such “goodies” on these rural and urban lower middle-class seats, even if it is only for two or three more months, the more such seats could, in theory, be won by BN. On the other hand, the federal opposition parties, although also in charge of several state governments, are not in similarly privileged positions to command and deliver such “resources” to the same cohort of voters. This is because the political system of the country was set up in such a way that political, economic and other forms of power are highly concentrated in the hands of the central government. Thus, as time wears on, the meagre “voter-friendly” resources that the opposition commands would be dissipated sooner than those possessed by BN. These “influential” voters would then be subject to a choice between long-standing, instant delivery of “resources” and thus-far farfetched promises of future equity. The choice then is rather obvious for these voters who are relatively less exposed to worldly information. Meanwhile, the more highly educated and well-exposed urban upper middle-class voters could actually be discounted by BN as they would in any case vote for the opposition, but are of little seat-count importance.
Well, as it happened, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak decided to call for the dissolution of parliament a day after its last session ended — a session that saw the adoption of a new, rather controversial parliamentary constituency redelineation as well as an even more disturbing Anti-Fake News Bill. The election is scheduled for May 9 with an 11-day campaign period. At the very least, this choice of an earlier election date expresses confidence on the part of Najib and BN (especially its main component party Umno) to once again clinch at least a simple majority to continue their six-decade continued hold on governmental power — the longest among electoral democracies, mature or otherwise.
This heightened level of confidence is most likely exuded by the “maverick” role played by an erstwhile political rival party of Umno. The Islamist party PAS was formed by a combination of disgruntled Umno members, religious scholars and even professionals more than half a century ago and won a sporadic number of parliamentary seats over the years. It briefly joined BN in the 1970s but left soon to pursue its own primarily religious goals. After teaming up with two other main opposition parties, PKR and DAP, to form Pakatan Rakyat (PR) and succour the coalition with its primarily rural support base, the coalition went on to twice deny BN its much-vaunted two-thirds constitution-amending parliamentary majority in 2008 and 2013. Soon after the last GE, PAS, in its infinite political wisdom, decided to abandon its much-attenuated, somewhat moderate characteristics, and revert to its old-time relentless pursuit of an eventual theocratic outlook for the country. Perhaps PAS felt that if the Malaysian society were theocratised wholesale, it would command unbridled religiopolitical powers as the preeminent religiously inspired party.
In any case, PAS decided to, in essence, enlist Umno’s “permission”, if not outright help, to attain such ultimate theocratic goals. Perhaps it felt that an ethnocentric party such as Umno can be a more ideologically compatible political partner, in stark contrast to PKR and DAP, which are more secular-oriented, multiracial parties as race and religion are constitutionally “fused” in Malaysia, at least when it comes to the definition of Malays. Umno is, of course, also eager to reciprocate PAS’ political overtures, as it would no doubt split the PR coalition, which PAS eventually did as it estranged itself from PR and brought away a huge base of erstwhile PR (now morphed into Pakatan Harapan or PH) supporters. Together, Umno and PAS attempted numerously to push through parliament an enabling act for expansion of the powers of religious courts.
In the forthcoming GE, PAS has vowed to contest as many as 130 parliamentary seats. If these were to come to pass, PAS candidates will create many at least three-cornered fights that would otherwise see only straight one-to-one standoffs between BN and PH. And they would primarily detract from the opposition votes that are perhaps somewhat unsatisfied with BN but equally uncomfortable with the secular, moderate and progressive outlook of PH. In a first-past-the-post electoral system, that would almost guarantee wins for BN, especially Umno. PAS could also enable the formation of Umno-led coalition governments in states such as Selangor, if Umno were to win more seats.
The innate nature of the conservatives and young Turks who are holding the reins of power in PAS is such that while they do place some importance on retaining the state government in Kelantan and perhaps even plucking one or two more states such as Kedah or Terengganu, perhaps in coalition with Umno, their much more overwhelming concern is to be allowed to incrementally impose their theocratic outlook on the hitherto secular society. As for Umno, its unsung alliance with PAS is almost akin to a political insurance policy such that if the crucial rural and urban lower middle-class voters decide to not vote for Umno, they would nevertheless be “captured” by PAS, and together, Umno and PAS could, at the very least, forge a working coalition.
Thus, this GE envisages an almost foregone conclusion of yet another BN win with even a plausibility of reclaiming their much-avowed two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Dr Oh Ei Sun advises policy institutes in Malaysia and abroad. He was political secretary to the prime minister from 2009 to 2011.
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